Jensen Huang’s ‘Pandora’s Prophecy’: Why Nvidia’s CEO Sees a Formidable Rival in Huawei

Amid U.S. Sanctions, an Unforeseen Innovation Surge and the Nvidia Chief’s Unease Over a Shifting Tech Chessboard

"Huawei is one of the strongest tech companies in the world... They have a multitude of talented engineers... They are very formidable competitors."

Coming from an ordinary business leader, such words might be dismissed as standard industry pleasantries. But when the speaker is Jensen Huang, the founder of Nvidia, the titan of the global AI chip industry – a Silicon Valley legend born in Tainan, Taiwan, and often dubbed the "AI godfather" – the remarks carry a different weight. This isn't just an assessment; it's more akin to a prophecy, a warning bell tolling across the U.S.-China tech divide.

Why would Huang, a tech magnate renowned for his signature leather jacket and keen insight into industry trends, offer such a candid, almost deferential, evaluation of a company mired in U.S. sanctions? Is it mere commiseration, or is there a deeper, more intricate calculation at play? Let's peel back the layers and take a bird's-eye view of the high-stakes game behind Huang’s "immense pressure" and how it reverberates through the tech world, particularly for Taiwan's pivotal industry.

Huawei’s Metamorphosis: Down, But Far From Out?

To understand Huang’s concerns, one must first grasp Huawei's current stature. For many, the image of Huawei is still tied to its once-dominant smartphone business, crippled by U.S. edicts. But this perspective underestimates the tech giant's resilience and capacity for transformation.

Huawei is no longer just a smartphone or telecom equipment vendor. It has evolved into an "octopus," its tentacles reaching into nearly every corner of the tech industry: from cloud computing (Huawei Cloud) and AI chips (Ascend series) to server CPUs (Kunpeng series), AI frameworks (MindSpore), operating systems (HarmonyOS), and even intelligent driving solutions for automobiles. This full-stack vertical integration, "from foundational technology to application scenarios," allows it to assemble solutions like Lego bricks, creating a formidable systemic force. Its Ascend 910B chip, for instance, is already widely deployed in AI computing centers across China, directly challenging Nvidia's product lines. According to Canalys, in Q3 2023, Huawei Cloud held a 19% share of mainland China's cloud infrastructure services market, second only to Alibaba Cloud. This comprehensive reach means that even with Nvidia’s lead in AI chips, it faces a competitor offering the "whole meal."

An "Obsession" with R&D: Sanctions Spur an IP Explosion

Technological moats are built with significant capital and countless engineering hours. Huawei's investment in research and development borders on obsessive. Notably, its R&D spending has increased, not decreased, since the sanctions. Huawei's 2023 annual report revealed R&D expenditure reached 164.7 billion RMB (approx. $23 billion), accounting for 23.4% of its total revenue – a figure that ranks among the highest for global tech giants. This determination—"if they choke us, we'll build our own heart"—is fueling an unexpected intellectual property boom.

The Sanctions Boomerang: Washington's Punch, Huawei's Counter?

This is the core of Huang's "immense pressure": U.S. sanctions, intended to cripple, have inadvertently acted as a catalyst, compelling China's tech sector, particularly Huawei, down an arduous but potentially transformative path of self-reliance.

The 2023 debut of Huawei's Mate 60 Pro smartphone, powered by the Kirin 9000S chip, was arguably the most striking demonstration of this technological breakout. TechInsights, a leading semiconductor analysis firm, confirmed the chip was manufactured by SMIC using a process near 7-nanometer technology. This implies that even without access to the most advanced EUV lithography machines, China's domestic semiconductor industry found a way to "detour." This "boomerang" hit hard against those who believed China's chip industry was incapacitated.

The Rise of a Domestic Supply Chain: A "New Naura Moment"?

What many overlook is that beyond lithography machines, the lengthy chip manufacturing chain involves countless critical materials, equipment, and precision instruments, historically dominated by U.S., Japanese, and European firms. The pressure of sanctions, however, has given Chinese domestic suppliers a chance to be "seen and supported." A trend of "domestic substitution" is now palpable across China.

In fields like photoresists, sputtering targets, high-purity chemicals, and inspection equipment, local companies are striving to fill the void. Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), China's leading hope in lithography, while still far behind ASML's top-tier EUV machines, continues to make progress in DUV (deep ultraviolet) and explore more advanced processes, embodying the ambition to break the blockade.
A case in point for this broader ecosystem development is called SiCarrier. This leading Chinese enterprise had reportedly established a full-process equipment array covering lithography, etching, thin-film deposition, and metrology by 2022, though metrology still relied on imports. By March 2024, at SEMICon China in Shanghai, it unveiled 31 core products, signaling that domestic metrology equipment was catching up. Furthermore, its 7nm etching equipment was reportedly entering the verification stage, and its ALD (Atomic Layer Deposition) equipment specifications were approaching those of ASML, laying a foundation to overcome China's chip yield bottlenecks.

These incremental, yet collectively significant, breakthroughs across numerous "less visible" segments are quietly altering the industry's underlying dynamics. It mirrors Japan's past trajectory in automobiles and home appliances, moving from imitation and catch-up to eventually surpassing Western brands. Huang likely sees not just Huawei's individual advances, but the accelerating formation of an entire "internal circulation" tech ecosystem in China.

The "Invisible Hand" of State Will and the "Strategic Depth" of Domestic Demand

The Chinese government has placed "tech self-reliance and self-strengthening" at the core of its national strategy, employing policy, funding, and market access to support local tech firms. Concurrently, China's vast domestic market provides fertile ground for these "alternatives" to be tested, iterated, and matured. Even if initial products are imperfect, they can secure orders driven by "patriotic consumption" or "supply chain security" considerations. This combination of "national team + home-field advantage" is a potent force few multinational corporations can match.

Nvidia's "Invisible Pain" in the Chinese Market

So, is Huang's "immense pressure" merely a respectful nod to Huawei's capabilities? Unlikely. Deeper commercial considerations for Nvidia's losses in China, and perhaps a subtle message to U.S. policymakers, are likely at play.

The Sting of a Lost Market: What Nvidia’s Earnings Reports Don't Shout

China was once Nvidia’s second-largest revenue generator after the U.S., especially for its data center AI chips. American export controls directly severed Nvidia's ability to sell its most advanced AI chips (like the full H100 and A100 versions) to China.
Before the bans, China accounted for 20% to 25% of Nvidia's data center revenue. Huang himself told the Financial Times in late 2023 that U.S. chip export restrictions were "tying our hands behind our back." While Nvidia rushed out compliant, downgraded "China-specific" chips (like the H20, L20, and L2), market reception has been lukewarm. Reuters reported that due to significant performance reductions and uncompetitive pricing, orders for the H20 chip in China were underwhelming, with major customers reportedly shifting to Huawei's Ascend chips or reducing Nvidia orders.
In 2024, China's accelerated computing chip market is estimated at around $20 billion. Huawei's Ascend chip shipments are projected at roughly 640,000 units, while Nvidia's shipments, though larger at 1.9 million units, see its overall market share declining to around 70%. If U.S.-China tech decoupling continues through 2027, Huawei could capture a market segment worth over $40 billion, inevitably fueling its R&D investments. For Nvidia, this isn't just a short-term revenue hit; it's ceding a market with enormous potential to a rising domestic rival, sowing seeds for greater challenges ahead. Huang knows that once Chinese customers adapt to the local AI ecosystem and develop path dependencies, regaining lost ground, even if policies ease, will be an uphill battle.

A Message to Washington: Speaking Softly, Carrying a Big Stick?

Huang's comments can also be interpreted as a sophisticated form of political lobbying. By highlighting Huawei's strength and the "counter-productive" effects of sanctions, he subtly signals to Washington that continued tech blockades may not only fail to neutralize a competitor but could instead foster an even more intractable one, ultimately harming American companies' global competitiveness. It's a reminder to policymakers to weigh the long-term impact on their own industries more carefully.

Implications for Taiwan's Tech Sector: Warning Bell or Turning Point?

Huawei's ascent in AI chips, servers, and related fields could impact Taiwan's IC design houses (like MediaTek) and its foundry supply chain. For example, a new AI model developed by Huawei in collaboration with DeepSeek reportedly boasts lower hardware costs while maintaining performance competitive with Nvidia-based solutions. While Taiwan's semiconductor industry, led by TSMC's advanced process technology (e.g., 2nm slated for 2025 mass production), holds an edge, it must be wary of China's capacity expansion in mature nodes (like 28nm), which has already grown by 31%. The U.S. push for "de-Chinafication" could accelerate supply chain restructuring. This prompts critical questions about what policies the Taiwanese government should enact to assist its supply chain vendors in establishing facilities in places like the Czech Republic or Japan, ensuring risk diversification.

Endgame: Pandora's Box is Open. How Does Taiwan Dance with the Wolves?

Jensen Huang's "immense pressure" is less about fear of Huawei per se, and more a profound concern that a "Pandora's Box" has been opened – unleashing a "new species" forged by geopolitics, national will, and market forces, one that is rewriting the rules of global tech competition.

For Taiwan, this presents an unprecedented challenge, but also potentially unforeseen opportunities. When the old order is disrupted, and a new one is yet to solidify, it's a moment to redefine one's value. Rather than resting on past laurels, Taiwan must confront the current shifts and seek opportunities for transformation and upgrading amidst the crisis. Huang's warning should not be mere tech news fodder, but a catalyst for deep reflection, consensus-building, and a determined push forward for Taiwanese society. After all, in the AI-driven Fourth Industrial Revolution, a moment's hesitation could mean being unceremoniously left behind.

AI教父的一聲長嘆，震動科技楚河漢界

「華為是全球最強的科技公司之一…他們擁有眾多有才華的工程師…他們是非常強大的競爭對手…。」這番話，若出自尋常企業家之口，或許只是商場上的客套。但當說話者是叱吒全球AI晶片界的Nvidia（輝達）創辦人黃仁勳——這位被譽為「AI教父」、出生台南的矽谷傳奇——其份量就截然不同。這不僅是一句評價，更像是一則預言，一聲警鐘，敲響在美中科技冷戰的楚河漢界上。

黃仁勳，這位總是身著招牌皮衣、對產業趨勢洞若觀火的科技巨擘，為何會對一家深陷美國制裁泥淖的公司，給出如此直白且略帶「示弱」的評價？難道只是兔死狐悲，抑或有更深層、更曲折的盤算？今天，讓我們撕開客套的糖衣，用上帝視角，深入剖析黃仁勳這番「壓力山大」背後的驚天棋局，以及它如何牽動著台灣科技業的敏感神經。

華為的「七十二變」—— 你以為它死了，它卻練成了金剛不壞？

要理解黃仁勳的壓力，首先得看清華為究竟是何方神聖。許多人對華為的印象，或許還停留在被美國一紙禁令打得奄奄一息的手機業務。但這，恰恰是低估了這頭科技巨獸的生存意志與轉型能耐。 華為早就不是單純的手機或電信設備商。它是一隻「八爪魚」，觸手已深入科技產業的每一個角落：從雲端（華為雲），到AI晶片（昇騰Ascend系列）、伺服器晶片（鯤鵬Kunpeng系列），再到AI框架（MindSpore）、作業系統（鴻蒙HarmonyOS），甚至連汽車的智慧駕駛解決方案都一手包辦。這種「從根技術到應用場景」的全產業鏈垂直整合，讓它能像樂高一樣，快速組合出各種解決方案，形成一股令人生畏的系統性力量。華為昇騰910B晶片，在中國本土市場的AI運算中心已大量部署，直接與Nvidia的產品線展開肉搏。根據Canalys數據，2023年第三季，華為雲在中國大陸雲基礎設施服務市場以19%的份額高居第二，緊追阿里雲之後。這種全方位覆蓋，讓Nvidia即便在AI晶片上擁有優勢，也得面對一個能提供「全家餐」的對手。

研發的「偏執狂」—— 被逼出來的「智產權大爆發」： 技術的壁壘，是用真金白銀和無數工程師的肝堆出來的。華為在研發上的投入，近乎偏執。尤其在遭受制裁後，其研發投入不減反增。根據華為2023年年報，其研發支出高達1647億人民幣，佔全年收入的23.4%，這比例放眼全球科技巨頭也是名列前茅。這種「別人卡我脖子，我就自己造心臟」的決心，正催生一場「意外的智產權大爆發」。

制裁的「迴力鏢」—— 華府一記重拳，竟打通了華為的「任督二脈」？

這才是黃仁勳「壓力山大」的核心——美國的制裁，本意是「釜底抽薪」，卻意外地扮演了「催化劑」的角色，逼使中國科技業，尤其是華為，走上了一條極端艱困卻也可能「彎道取經」的自主之路。 2023年，華為Mate 60 Pro手機搭載麒麟9000S晶片的「橫空出世」，無疑是這場科技突圍戰中最耀眼的一役。在全球頂尖半導體分析機構TechInsights拆解後，確認該晶片由中芯國際（SMIC）代工，採用了接近7奈米的製程技術。[3] 這意味著，即便在沒有最先進EUV光刻機的情況下，中國本土的半導體產業鏈，依然找到了「繞道而行」的辦法。這記「迴力鏢」，狠狠打在了那些認為中國晶片產業已無力回天的論者臉上。

國產供應鏈的「DeepSeek時刻」

許多人不知道的是，在晶片製造的漫長鏈條中，除了光刻機，還有無數關鍵的材料、設備與精密儀器。過去，這些領域大多被美、日、歐企業壟斷。然而，制裁的壓力，反而給了中國本土供應商一個「被看見、被扶持」的機會。我們可以觀察到類似的「國產替代」趨勢正在中國上演。

例如，在光刻膠、靶材、高純度化學品、檢測設備等領域，一批本土企業正努力填補空白。上海微電子裝備（SMEE）作為中國光刻機研發的「全村的希望」，雖然其產品與艾司摩爾（ASML）的頂級EUV仍有巨大差距，但其在DUV（深紫外光）領域的持續進展，以及對更先進製程光刻技術的探索，都承載著打破封鎖的期望。此外我還專題寫過一篇未曾發表的文章《新凱萊，全球半導體爭霸戰中的中國挑戰者》中特別有這樣一段內容：

“這家中國龍頭企業在 2022 年已建構起涵蓋光刻、蝕刻、薄膜沉積、量測的全流程設備陣列，但量測設備仍倚賴進口。直至 2025 年3月26日，其在 SEMICon China 於上海一口氣發表 31 項核心產品，正式宣告國產量測設備補齊，且 7 奈米蝕刻設備已進入驗證階段，ALD（原子層沉積）設備規格亦接近 ASML水準，為中國晶片良率瓶頸打下突破基礎。”

這種在無數個「不起眼」的環節上，由點到線、由線到面的自主突破，正悄悄改變著產業的底層邏輯。 就像當年日本在汽車、家電領域，也是從模仿、追趕，最終實現了對歐美品牌的超越。黃仁勳看到的，恐怕不僅是華為單點的突破，更是背後整個中國「科技內循環」體系的加速成形。

國家意志的「無形之手」與龐大內需的「戰略縱深」： 中國政府將「科技自立自強」置於國家戰略的核心，透過政策、資金、市場准入等全方位手段，為本土科技企業保駕護航。同時，中國巨大的內需市場，為這些「替代品」提供了試錯、迭代和成長的沃土。即便初期產品不完美，也能在「愛國消費」或「供應鏈安全」的考量下獲得訂單。這種「國家隊+主場優勢」的組合拳，是任何跨國企業都難以匹敵的。

Nvidia在中國市場的「隱形陣痛」

那麼，黃仁勳的「壓力山大」，僅僅是對華為實力的「英雄惜英雄」嗎？恐怕沒那麼簡單。其背後，更深藏著Nvidia在中國市場切膚之痛的商業考量，以及對美國政策制定者的一種巧妙「喊話」。

失去中國市場的「割肉之痛」—— 輝達財報不會說的秘密

中國市場，對Nvidia而言，曾是僅次於美國的第二大金雞母，尤其在資料中心AI晶片業務上。美國的出口管制，直接斬斷了Nvidia向中國銷售其最高階AI晶片（如H100、A100完整版）的通路。

在禁令生效前，中國市場一度佔據Nvidia資料中心業務營收的20%至25%。[4] 黃仁勳在2023年底接受《金融時報》採訪時也坦言，美國對華晶片出口限制，正讓美國科技公司「束手束腳」(tying our hands behind our back)。[5]雖然Nvidia緊急推出了符合規範的「中國特供版」降規晶片（如H20、L20、L2），但市場反應卻是雷聲大雨點小。據路透社報導，由於性能削減過多且價格不具競爭力，H20晶片在中國市場的訂單情況並不理想，甚至出現主要客戶轉向採購華為昇騰晶片或減少Nvidia訂單的現象。[6] 2024年中國加速計算芯片市場總規模約在200億美元左右，華為昇騰芯片出貨64萬片左右，其中英偉達出貨190萬片整體份額下降至70%。如果到2027年中美科技脫鉤那麼華為將獲得超過400億規模市場份額，這必然加速華為在科技研發上的不遺餘力投入。對英偉達來說這不僅是短期營收的損失，更是將潛力巨大的市場拱手讓給了正在崛起的本土對手，為未來埋下了更大的隱患。 黃仁勳深知，一旦中國客戶習慣了本土AI生態，形成了路徑依賴，未來即便政策鬆綁，要再奪回失土，恐怕難如登天。

「項莊舞劍，意在沛公」—— 對華府的溫情喊話

黃仁勳的言論，也可以解讀為一種高段位的「政治遊說」。他藉由強調華為的強大與制裁的「反作用力」，巧妙地向華府傳遞訊息：持續的科技封鎖，不僅未能徹底扼殺對手，反而可能催生出一個更難纏、更不受控的競爭者，最終損害的還是美國企業自身的全球競爭力。這是在提醒決策者，制定政策時，需要更審慎地評估其對本國產業的長遠影響。

對台灣科技產業的啟示 —— 警鐘抑或轉機？

華為在AI晶片、伺服器等領域的崛起，可能衝擊台灣IC設計（如聯發科）和代工供應鏈。例如，華為與DeepSeek合作的新版AI模型，硬體成本更低，性能卻不輸Nvidia方案。台灣半導體業雖有台積電在先進製程領先（如2奈米2025年量產），但需警惕中國在成熟製程（如28nm）的產能擴張311。美國推動「去中化」可能加速供應鏈重組。台灣政府推動怎樣的相關政策，來協助供應量廠商在捷克、日本設廠，確保風險分散等都是值得思考的話題。

終局思考：潘朵拉的盒子已開，台灣如何「與狼共舞」？

黃仁勳的「壓力山大」，與其說是對華為的恐懼，不如說是他對一個「潘朵拉盒子」被打開後的深沉憂慮——一個由地緣政治、國家意志與市場力量共同催生出的「新物種」，正在改寫全球科技競爭的規則。

對台灣而言，這既是前所未有的挑戰，也可能隱藏著意想不到的轉機。當舊秩序被打破，新秩序尚未建立之際，正是重新定義自身價值的時刻。與其沉溺於過去的榮光，不如正視眼前的變局，在危機中尋找轉型升級的契機。黃仁勳的警告，不應只被視為科技新聞的談資，更應成為台灣社會深刻反思、凝聚共識、奮力突圍的「催化劑」。畢竟，在AI引領的第四次工業革命浪潮中，稍有不慎，就可能被無情地甩下牌桌。